Any suggestion of altering the genetic makeup of human beings through gene therapy is quite likely to provoke a response involving some reference to a
'Within these "imaginaires populaires" of this new discipline are found the legacy of Mary Shelley's Frankenstein and George Orwell's 1984. The Nazi experiment and the scientific and technological advances of the last decade have fuelled this public perception. The practice of genetic medicine finds itself therefore in an emotionally charged atmosphere' (2).
Thirdly, slippery slope arguments can carry greater force where the discussion centres on a topic which, because of its complexity and the use of genetic technology, is one of those categories of medicine which is perceived as being in some way potentially malevolent.
What is a slippery slope argument?
The basic structure of a slippery slope argument is fairly straightforward: 'If we allow somatic cell gene therapy now then germ line gene therapy may follow and since germ line gene therapy is morally unacceptable we should not begin by allowing somatic cell gene therapy'. The basic structure of the slippery slope argument has been outlined by Frederick Schauer:
'... regardless of the term employed, the phenomenon referred to is the same. The single argumentative claim ... is that a particular act, seemingly innocent when taken in isolation, may yet lead to a future host of similar but increasingly pernicious events' (3).
There are a number of characteristic components of a slippery slope argument whose presence should alert us to the type of argument being pursued as well as shedding some light on the nature of the argument itself. The first characteristic is described by Schauer as 'the implicit concession'. This is the point usually made at the outset of the argument that the instant case under consideration is itself quite innocuous. Analysis of the implications of gene therapy regularly start from the premise that somatic cell gene therapy is acceptable. LeRoy Walters has identified 20 policy statements by eminent bodies which 'accept the moral legitimacy of somatic cell gene therapy for the cure of ... disease' (4) .
The second characteristic of a slippery slope argument is that the two cases in question, the instant case and the undesirable danger case, can be separated from one another by some type of linguistic boundary. Somatic cell gene therapy can be linguistically distinguished from germ line gene therapy simply by describing how somatic cell therapy involves the treatment of one single individual, whereas the goal of germ line gene therapy is the permanent alteration of the germ line in order to prevent certain characteristics of disorders recurring in future generations.
A difficulty which nurtures these types of arguments is that of linguistic imprecision. Our capacity to express ourselves is finite. In order to attempt to draw a distinction between something as complex as somatic cell gene therapy and germ line gene therapy, the descriptions will necessarily be complex and technical, requiring both a degree of prior knowledge and interpretative skill. This difficulty can be exacerbated by the use of sloppy or vague language, which is sometimes deliberate. In law, it is not unusual for controversial legislation to be peppered with vague expressions which devolve the resolution of potentially divisive issues onto the judiciary and the courts.
Linguistic imprecision is, however, only part of the equation. Descriptions, whether they be of germ line gene therapy or the thirty-miles-per-hour speed limit must be interpreted. However, the message received is not always identical to the message sent, particularly if there has been a lapse in time. This is particularly true of legal interpretation, as Judge Cardozo noted:
'The half truths of one generation tend at times to perpetuate themselves in the law as the whole truths of another, when constant repetition brings it about that qualifications, taken once for granted are disregarded or forgotten' (5).
A final defining feature of a slippery slope argument is the increased risk of a calamitous conclusion brought about by permitting the instant case. It is a key feature of the slippery slope argument that the degree of risk will always be dramatically increased by permitting the first prima facie innocuous event. This is what makes the slope slippery, otherwise it would just be a normally treacherous incline. Having set out the parameters of the argument, the remainder of this discussion will focus on two par- These 'logical' slippery slope arguments have considerable force when we are discussing the morality of certain courses of action. However, when we come to consider law it becomes apparent that certain clear distinctions can be made. Law is an allembracing term and the validity or strength of slippery slope arguments depends on whether we are referring to statutory laws or precedent (7). With unambiguous legislation logical slippery slope arguments may have little or no force. This is often illustrated by examples about speed limits. Although there is no practical or morally significant difference between thirty miles per hour and thirty-one miles per hour this does not mean that the speed limit will, or should, become thirty-one miles per hour. It is the power of law in such contexts to impose with moral force the type of arbitrary cut-off points which lack cogency in moral argument. A logical slippery slope argument can therefore be seen to have relatively little force in the context of legislation.
Judge-made case law, or precedent, is rather more vulnerable to slippery slope claims than legislation. Firstly, the whole process of adjudication in many ways involves and resembles critical moral reasoning and so slippery slope arguments can have more force (8). Secondly, the nature of the rules of precedent are such that they impel many judges to decide cases within a narrowly circumscribed framework dictated by previous decisions. Thus there is much less scope for them to legislate and set clear and arbitrary limits. Similarly judges may feel constrained from setting such limits because to do so would be a 'naked usurpation of the function of the legislature' (9). There are constitutional reasons why judges are less likely to impose clear limits and case law is therefore more likely to be influenced by logical slippery slope arguments.
This feature is exacerbated by the nature of adjudication in a precedent-based legal system. Cases are decided in a step by step manner, and while there are no sudden variations in the law, incremental change does come about through the development of existing precedents. Thus the second type of logical slippery slope argument may have some force in relation to judge-made law. The problem is complicated by the fact that it is difficult to make reasonable and enforceable distinctions in judge-made law. In legislation such distinctions can be made and enforced on what appear to be flimsy and illogical grounds (10). Another reason why law seems vulnerable to slippery slope arguments is because of its historical nature. Both in the development of the common law and in the drafting of legislation, there tends to be an awareness of what has gone before as well as a desire to provide for the future (11).
Rhetorical slippery slopes
The rhetorical slippery slope arguments are presented as the other half of a dichotomous family of arguments. However, the taxonomy does not fit perfectly and the increasing use of the term 'psychological' to describe this particular variety of argument may have as much to do with a desire for verbal tidiness as it does with philosophical integrity.
This form of the slippery slope argument tends to be most commonly used in popular discourse. Thus it is not uncommon, in discussions on topics such as euthanasia or abortion, to hear claims that if we allow the legalisation of mercy killing of individuals in terminal and intractable pain we will be taking the first step towards the type of genocide perpetrated by the Nazis. The exact process which could lead from allowing defences of mercy killing to Nazi-style genocide is rarely explicitly sketched out, but the argument undoubtedly had great rhetorical force.
The case of euthanasia in the Netherlands has been suggested as an example of such a slippery slope in action (12). Since the early 1970s the practice of euthanasia has become an established part of Dutch medical practice. Euthanasia was not legalised as such but a practice had grown up whereby doctors who performed so-called 'mercy killings' were unlikely to be prosecuted under the Dutch criminal law. In January 1994, after two decades of turning something of a blind eye to the practice of euthanasia (13) Both the logical forms of the slippery slope arguments are based around arguments about whether or not a clear distinction can be drawn between the two categories of gene therapy. I have argued that such a clear conceptual difference can be drawn. This seriously weakens the first form of the argument although it does not particularly affect the second form of the argument. The last vestiges of force in both lie in the proposition that it would be morally unacceptable to allow germ line gene therapy (20).
In conclusion, both logical forms of the argument begin with a simplistic vision of the regulatory mechanisms already in place to scrutinise genetic manipulations. They are further weakened by the fact that gene therapy is a rare incidence of scientific enterprise which lends itself spectacularly well to the drawing of bright non-arbitrary lines. Finally they both present an unchallenged but extremely challengeable assumption that the acceptance of germ line gene therapy would be morally abhorrent.
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